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The World Bank Sanction System: Moving Towards a Present Responsibility Model

Franco Peirone


Keywords: World Bank, Sanction System, Present Responsibility

The article analyses the steps through which the World Bank could reform its sanction system by focusing more on corporate compliance efforts instead of issuing debarment at all costs. To accomplish this change the World Banks should set conditional non-debarment as the system default sanction – using debarment only as an extrema ratio – and make a more extended use of flexible, discretionary tools (administrative agreements, voluntary disclosure programme and mitigation measures) which foster corporate compliance. By putting corporate compliance at the forefront the World Bank would reach more integrity in its contract, increase competition among honest contractors and tackle better the performance risk.

Franco Peirone, Post-doctoral Emile Noël Fellow, Jean Monnet Center, New York University; LL.B., M.A. (2011, University of Torino), Ph.D. (2015, University of Torino); LL.M. (2017, New York University).


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