Wojciech Hartung, Tomasz Zielenkiewicz

European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, Volume 18 (2023), Issue 2, Page 121 - 128

One of the elements explicitly indicated in Article 69 of Directive 2014/24/EU that should be taken into account by the contracting authority when assessing the credibility/reliability of a tender is the question of State aid received by a contractor and its impact on the price the contractor offers (Article 69(2)(f) of Directive 2014/24/EU). Keywords: public procurement; abnormally low tender; State aid; economic advantage

Penelope Alexia Giosa

European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, Volume 13 (2018), Issue 1, Page 30 - 38

Splitting large public contracts into lots fosters competition in the long and short run, and enhances the participation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in public procurement proceedings. However, the division of contracts into lots can also facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as bid rigging. In order to deal with this, economic theory has established two basic rules. The first one is that the number of lots should be smaller than the expected number of participants. The second one is that the contracting authorities should define at least one lot more than the number of incumbents and reserve it to new entrants. This paper discusses these rules and investigates to what extent they can indeed cope successfully with bid rigging. As it will be proved, they are not panacea for all cases of bid rigging and it is not always practically possible to apply them. Therefore, they need further elaboration and amendments. Suggestions will be made about how we could make them more effective. Some of these recommendations are based on ideas taken from the legal regime of USA.

Zbigniew Raczkiewicz

European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, Volume 13 (2018), Issue 3, Page 229 - 233

Karolina Lehto

European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, Volume 12 (2017), Issue 3, Page 346 - 351