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Die Suche erzielte 3 Treffer.

Substantial Modifications of Public Contracts and Their Consequences: Journal Artikel

European and Belgian Procurement Law Perspectives

Steven Van Garsse, Simon Verhoeven, Alexander Verschave

European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, Jahrgang 16 (2021), Ausgabe 4, Seite 284 - 294

In this contribution we discuss the consequences of the contract when it has been modified in a substantial manner. On a European level there has been provided in the sanction of the ineffectiveness of the contract, which procedure can be initiated within six months after the change has happend. In Belgian law there is also the sanction of the annulment of the contract, whereby the contract can be declared null, which can be invoked even after the six month period, thus it seems. In this contribution we formulate some critical remarks on the situation in Belgium. Keywords: substantial modifications, sanction of annulment, sanction of ineffectiveness


Sanctionable Misconduct in the Procurement Legislation of Azerbaijan Journal Artikel

Teymour Aliyev

European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, Jahrgang 14 (2019), Ausgabe 1, Seite 55 - 62

The Republic of Azerbaijan, as a young member of the Council of Europe, which ratified and implemented to its legislation the provisions of numerous conventions against corruption as well as other international agreements on combating transnational crimes, money laundering and other corruption-related misconduct, and by being a developing country and benefiting from loans and other funds provided by the World Bank Group (WBG), should substantially upgrade its anti-corruption legislation and especially in the procurement area in order to keep pace with fast changing international standards. Whilst the concept of corruption may be more or less universal both in the national legislation and international normative documents, the notions of fraud and other ‘corruption-related’ misbehaviour in laws of Azerbaijan should be clearly defined and advanced to match the definitions used by the WBG and other multilateral development banks. And when they are legibly defined, the grounds for the exclusion and debarment of bidders and contractors committing such misconduct and sanctions should be broadened and differentiated with an eye to ensure fairness of the procurement process and harmonization with regulations applied internationally. In this work the terms of corruption, forgery, fraud and coercion according to the national legislation of Azerbaijan and the WBG standards have been analysed and compared. Further, in order to demonstrate legal shortages and loopholes at the national level, the legal grounds for the exclusion and debarment of bidders committing corruption-related acts at procurement procedures in Azerbaijan and its champion company SOCAR, and the type of applicable sanctions, with comparison to the provisions of the suspension and debarment standards employed by the WBG, have been described. Finally, the author has tried to offer proposals on the elimination of regulatory gaps for the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness and fairness of procurement-related exclusion and debarment process in Azerbaijan. Keywords: Corruption-related Misconduct; Sanctions; Exclusion; Debarment; World Bank Group; Procurement legislation.


The World Bank Sanction System: Moving Towards a Present Responsibility Model Journal Artikel

Franco Peirone

European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, Jahrgang 13 (2018), Ausgabe 1, Seite 18 - 29

The article analyses the steps through which the World Bank could reform its sanction system by focusing more on corporate compliance efforts instead of issuing debarment at all costs. To accomplish this change the World Banks should set conditional non-debarment as the system default sanction – using debarment only as an extrema ratio – and make a more extended use of flexible, discretionary tools (administrative agreements, voluntary disclosure programme and mitigation measures) which foster corporate compliance. By putting corporate compliance at the forefront the World Bank would reach more integrity in its contract, increase competition among honest contractors and tackle better the performance risk.

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