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Abnormally Low Tenders from a Competition Law Perspective

Rachel Scheele, Grith Skovgaard Ølykke

DOI https://doi.org/10.21552/epppl/2023/2/8

Keywords: Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU, Directive 2014/24/EU, bid-rigging, predatory pricing, principle of equal treatment


This article analyses the application of competition rules to abnormally low tenders. The purpose is to determine whether – and under which circumstances – abnormally low tenders may constitute violations of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as well as how contracting authorities may or should proceed in case of potential infringements of competition law. It is concluded that abnormally low tenders may indeed violate EU competition law, which can lead to distortions of competition in public procurement markets in the short and/or long run, resulting in a decrease of social welfare. The parallel existences of the two sets of rules that regulate low prices – but which do not entirely coincide – do not seem to facilitate enforcement of competition law violations, which is crucial to obtaining efficient public procurement. Some proposals for a more competition-oriented approach to abnormally low tenders are provided.
Keywords: Article 101 TFEU; Article 102 TFEU; Directive 2014/24/EU; bid-rigging; predatory pricing; principle of equal treatment

Rachel Scheele, Junior Commercial Law Consultant, Law Firm Poul Schmith, and Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, PhD, Commercial Law Consultant, Principal, Law Firm Poul Schmith, external lecturer at Copenhagen Business School. For correspondence: <mailto:rsch@poulschmith.com> and <mailto:grol@poulschmith.com>, respectively. The opinions expressed are those of the authors alone.

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