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The Prior Information Notice and the Obligation of Motivation · Case C‑515/18 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Regione Autonoma della Sardegna · Annotation by Federica Maldari journal article

Annotation on the Judgment of the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) of 24 October 2019 in Case C‑515/18 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Regione Autonoma della Sardegna

Federica Maldari

European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, Volume 15 (2020), Issue 1, Page 75 - 79

The case deals with the interpretation of Article 7(2) and (4) of Regulation (EC) 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services relating to the direct award of the public service contract, by paying attention to the opening of the transport services sector to competition. The request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU concerning the interpretation of those provisions was part of the proceedings between the Italian Competition Authority and the Region of Sardinia on the direct award of the contract for the transport of passengers by rail to Trenitalia S.p.A. by that Region. The referring Court asked the Court of Justice whether those provisions must be interpreted as meaning that the competent authority which intends to award a contract directly must take the necessary steps to open the transport services sector to competition by publishing or communicating, to all interested economic operators, all the information necessary to allow them to submit a serious and reasonable offer, and by carrying out a comparative assessment of all bids. Keywords: Direct award procedure; Tender procedure; Public passenger transport services; Competition; Bids; Prior information notice; Comparative assessment; Obligation of motivation.


Division of Public Contracts into Lots and Bid Rigging: Can Economic Theory Provide an Answer? journal article

Penelope Alexia Giosa

European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, Volume 13 (2018), Issue 1, Page 30 - 38

Splitting large public contracts into lots fosters competition in the long and short run, and enhances the participation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in public procurement proceedings. However, the division of contracts into lots can also facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as bid rigging. In order to deal with this, economic theory has established two basic rules. The first one is that the number of lots should be smaller than the expected number of participants. The second one is that the contracting authorities should define at least one lot more than the number of incumbents and reserve it to new entrants. This paper discusses these rules and investigates to what extent they can indeed cope successfully with bid rigging. As it will be proved, they are not panacea for all cases of bid rigging and it is not always practically possible to apply them. Therefore, they need further elaboration and amendments. Suggestions will be made about how we could make them more effective. Some of these recommendations are based on ideas taken from the legal regime of USA.

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